Shai: Enforcing Data-Specific Policies with Near-Zero Runtime Overhead by Elnikety, Eslam et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
04
56
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 J
an
 20
18
SHAI: Enforcing Data-Specific Policies with
Near-Zero Runtime Overhead
Eslam Elnikety Deepak Garg Peter Druschel
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
{elnikety, dg, druschel}@mpi-sws.org
Abstract—Data retrieval systems such as online search engines
and online social networks must comply with the privacy policies
of personal and selectively shared data items, regulatory policies
regarding data retention and censorship, and the provider’s own
policies regarding data use. Enforcing these policies is difficult
and error-prone. Systematic techniques to enforce policies are
either limited to type-based policies that apply uniformly to all
data of the same type, or incur significant runtime overhead.
This paper presents SHAI, the first system that systematically
enforces data-specific policies with near-zero overhead in the
common case. SHAI’s key idea is to push as many policy checks as
possible to an offline, ahead-of-time analysis phase, often relying
on predicted values of runtime parameters such as the state
of access control lists or connected users’ attributes. Runtime
interception is used sparingly, only to verify these predictions and
to make any remaining policy checks. Our prototype implemen-
tation relies on efficient, modern OS primitives for sandboxing
and isolation. We present the design of SHAI and quantify its
overheads on an experimental data indexing and search pipeline
based on the popular search engine Apache Lucene.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data retrieval systems store, aggregate, index, recommend,
and serve information. Examples include large-scale online
social media sites, search engines, and e-commerce sites,
but also numerous organizational, corporate, and government
information services. To the extent that such systems serve
personal or private information, they are subject to various
data use policies.
Each data item served or used by a retrieval system may
have its own individual usage policy. For instance, Alice’s e-
mails are private to Alice, whereas Bob’s e-mails are private to
Bob. A particular blog post of Alice may be public, whereas
another of hers may be available only to her friends. In
addition to personal access control settings, the system may
need to to comply with local laws and regulations regarding
data retention and censorship. Finally, the system must comply
with the provider’s own privacy policy, which may stipulate,
for instance, that a user’s query and click stream be used only
for personalization.
Ensuring compliance with all applicable data use policies
in a large and agile data retrieval system presents a significant
technical challenge. When compliance checks are entangled
with application code, the policies in effect are difficult to
audit and maintain. Moreover, any application bug or miscon-
figuration can cause a policy violation. As a result, there has
been significant work on ensuring policy compliance separate
from application code [7], [16]. However, existing systems for
compliance are either limited to type-based policies [16], or
their runtime overhead is too high for large-scale data retrieval
systems [7].
Many of the data use policies that arise in practice are
per-user, data-specific polices. For instance, the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) explicitly grants users
individual choice regarding the use of their personal data [2].
Enforcing individual, data-specific policies, however, requires
runtime enforcement for two reasons. First, static analysis
loses precision quickly under data-specific policies, because
the policy in effect for a particular program variable depends
on the value assigned to it at runtime. Second, policies often
refer to information only available at runtime. For example,
whether an access is requested on behalf of user Alice is
known only at runtime. Besides users’ identity, data use
policies often refer to users’ geographic location (e.g., when
a data item is censored in a specific jurisdiction), wall-clock
time (e.g., when a news ticker item expires at a specific time),
or content (e.g., a user’s current list of friends).
In this work, we propose SHAI, a novel system for policy
compliance that can enforce fine-grained, data- and user-
specific declarative policies with near-zero runtime overhead
in the common case. SHAI combines offline, static flow anal-
ysis and light-weight runtime monitoring using an operating
system’s capability sandbox. The idea behind SHAI is to try
and push as much work as possible to the offline flow analysis
to minimize and streamline the remaining, required runtime
monitoring. The design of SHAI is based on the following
ideas:
a) Use of offline flow analysis: Many aspects of a data
retrieval system’s runtime behavior can be predicted statically
and based on runtime monitoring. These aspects include the
normal flow of information among the system’s components
(tasks), the set of policies currently in effect, the set of users,
and the geographic region(s) from which a user typically
connects. Based on this information, an offline analysis (OA)
predicts the taint each of the system’s tasks will acquire at
runtime, subject to assumptions about the value of runtime
variables. Finally, the OA compiles, for each task and each
predicted runtime value, the predicted taint into a set of
capabilities for all compliant I/O accesses.
b) Session-level binding of runtime information: Many
runtime variables that are unknown during an offline analysis
become known at the start of a user session. These variables
include the identity of the user, the geographic region from
Fig. 1: SHAI data flow model.
which the user connects, and the wall-clock time. Based on the
actual values of these variables, SHAI assigns the appropriate
capability set provided by the OA for each task involved. If
the value of a runtime variable is not among those predicted
during the OA, SHAI registers the value as one that should be
considered during the next OA.
c) OS sandbox to allow compliant I/O without runtime
intervention: In SHAI, each of the system’s tasks is encapsu-
lated in an OS sandbox subject to capability-based I/O access
control. When a user session starts, SHAI grants each task
the capability set predicted by the OA and selected based
on available runtime information. As a result, the system
can perform compliant accesses without runtime intervention.
Because the capability checks are light-weight and performed
by the OS kernel, their overhead is very low. In the common
case where the runtime values are among those predicted by
the OA, the cost of enforcing compliance is near-zero.
d) Runtime reference monitor as a fall-back: If a task
performs an I/O access for which it does not have a valid
capability, control is transfered to the SHAI reference monitor
(RM), which performs a runtime policy check. The cause of
this event may be a non-compliant access, an imprecise OA, or
a change in the system state since the OA was performed (e.g.,
a change in policy, or an access to content that was created
after the OA). If the access is non-compliant, the RM denies
the offending access. If the access turns out to be compliant,
the RM allows the access and patches the task’s capability set
to reflect the latest set of compliant accesses.
e) Use of efficient OS isolation primitives: SHAI uses
light-weight contexts (lwCs) [13], an efficient OS isolation
primitive, to isolate multiple user sessions within the same
process, and to isolate SHAI’s reference monitor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide
an overview of SHAI and its components in Section II and
a detailed description of SHAI’s design in Section III. The
SHAI prototype implementation on FreeBSD is described in
Section IV and the results of an experimental evaluation are
presented in Section V. We present related work in Section VI
and we conclude in Section VII.
II. SHAI OVERVIEW
SHAI is a policy compliance system that helps data retrieval
system providers enforce confidentiality and integrity policies
on the data they collect and serve. We next describe SHAI’s
data flow model, policy model, overall architecture, and threat
model.
a) Data flow model: Figure 1 shows SHAI’s data flow
model. SHAI enforces data policies in systems that are struc-
tured as pipelines of tasks. Each task in the pipeline consumes
some data, processes it, and produces more data, which is
then consumed by the next task in the pipeline. Data enters
the pipeline, travels from one task to the next, and eventually
leaves the pipeline in conduits, which is SHAI’s generic
abstraction for any container of data. Files, named pipes,
network connections and tuples in key-value stores are all
conduits. Every conduit has a unique identifier—the full path
name for a file or a named pipe, the five tuple 〈srcIP, srcPort,
protocol, destIP, destPort〉 for a network connection and the
key for an entry in a key-value store. We distinguish three
kinds of conduits: ingress conduits that feed outside data to
the initial tasks of the pipeline, internal conduits that are used
to pass data between tasks of the pipeline, and egress conduits
that are used to transmit final outputs of the pipeline to external
applications or externally connected users.
b) Policy model: An administrator may associate a policy
with any ingress conduit. This policy is a one-point description
of all the confidentiality and integrity requirements of the
data entering the system through that conduit. For example,
the policy might say that the data (in the conduit) should be
accessible only to Alice, or that it should be accessible only
to Alice and her friends, or that it should not be accessible
to users connecting from a specific geographic region (where
the content may have been black-listed by legal mandate), or
that the data in the conduit must have a specific shape or
type. SHAI also allows policies to be associated with internal
conduits, but these internal policies do not have to be trusted
for enforcing the policies of ingress conduits.
SHAI always enforces every conduit’s policy, even on data
derived downstream from that conduit’s data. For example,
suppose an ingress conduit has a policy “private to Alice only”
and that the rest of the pipeline works as follows: The ingress
conduit is read by task A, which writes its output to a file f; file
f is read by task B, which then sends a message to a different
user Bob. The last message from task B to Bob potentially
violates the ingress conduit’s policy since it completes a flow
from Alice’s private data to Bob, so SHAI will not allow this
last message to be sent.
SHAI’s actual policies can be much richer than those in this
simple example and can specify declassification (i.e., policy
relaxation) based on clock time and the type and content
of data. More precisely, SHAI’s policies are specified in a
declarative policy language, nearly identical to that used in
Thoth [7]. In this language, a conduit’s policy has three rules:
1) A read rule specifies who can read the conduit’s data
directly; 2) A declassify rule specifies what read rules should
apply to conduits downstream in the pipeline, thus controlling
who can read derived data. The declassify rule specifies a set
of tests (called declassification conditions) on the global state
and data in any conduit downstream, and how the read rule
can be relaxed when each of those tests is satisfied; 3) An
update rule specifies what type of content can be written to
the conduit and by whom.
Note that SHAI’s policies are data-specific: Every piece of
data can have its own policy. In particular, two pieces of data
of the same type can have different policies. For example,
although a file containing Alice’s email and a file containing
Bob’s email have the same type “email”, both have different
policies—the former is accessible only to Alice while the latter
is accessible only to Bob. This contrasts with other work like
Grok [16], which enforces only type-specific policies, where
all data of the same type has the same policy.
For brevity, we do not describe the details of the policy
language here. All our development can be followed without
understanding the syntax of the language.
A. Standard solutions and their shortcomings
At an abstract level, enforcing SHAI’s policies requires
determining, for each egress conduit, which ingress conduits’
data could flow to it, and what declassification conditions (if
any) must be satisfied along the flow. This is a standard data
flow analysis problem, for which many different techniques
have been proposed in literature. We briefly outline these
existing techniques and their shortcomings in the context of
(SHAI-like) data-specific policies.
Static techniques determine flows by analyzing the source
code of the system. In addition to requiring the source code
and being language-specific, static techniques work well only
when enforcement is limited to type-specific policies. Static
techniques do not work well when policies are data-specific.
The reason is simple: Static techniques approximate data with
program variables; as a result, the analysis cannot distinguish
the policies of different data after they flow through the
same variable. Data-specific policies care about this difference,
while type-specific policies do not.
Dynamic fine-grained techniques, also known as runtime
taint tracking techniques, track data flows between program
variables, or between memory objects and machine registers at
runtime. Depending on the specific implementation, a dynamic
fine-grained technique may not have the shortcomings of
static techniques mentioned above, but dynamic fine-grained
techniques must intercept all memory and register reads and
writes. This interception makes their overhead prohibitively
high for most online systems (in the orders of upper 10s to
100s of percent).
Dynamic coarse-grained techniques track flows at coarser
granularity, typically only across tasks in a system but not
within each task. They only intercept reads and writes to
conduits shared between tasks. This is far more efficient
than tracking all reads and writes to registers and memory.
Theoretically, this comes at the cost of precision—if a task
reads a conduit f and later writes a conduit g, a coarse-grained
technique must conservatively assume that there is a flow
from f to g, even if the data written to g was independent
of the data read from f. This can cause overtainting. Practical
experience suggests that in data retrieval systems structured as
pipelines of tasks, this kind of precision loss can be mitigated
by a slight relaxation of policies [7]. Consequently, dynamic
coarse-grained tracking is a reasonable option for enforcing
SHAI-like policies.
Nonetheless, dynamic coarse-grained tracking still has a
significant performance impact, at least on moderate or high
throughput systems. As a case in point, the Thoth system [7],
which uses dynamic coarse-grained tracking to enforce poli-
cies identical to those considered in this paper, has a relative
overhead of almost 3.5% on the throughput of a simple data
indexing and search pipeline, even at a very modest throughput
of only ~300 queries/s/machine. As the throughput increases,
this relative overhead increases significantly, reaching over
23% at ~3,000 queries/s/machine on a port of Thoth to our
experimental setup (see Section V).
Hence, no existing system can enforce data-specific policies
with consistently low overhead. Our goal with SHAI is to
change this state of the art. Ideally, we want to enforce data-
specific policies with zero overhead. Of course, attaining this
ideal goal is impossible but as we show, we get very close.
a) Thoth: The starting point for our design is Thoth,
which can already enforce data-specific policies efficiently
in small-scale, low throughput systems. In the following, we
explain briefly how Thoth works, what the dominant sources
of overhead in Thoth are, and what SHAI does differently to
mitigate these overheads.
As stated above, Thoth performs coarse-grained runtime
flow tracking to enforce policies. Thoth maps tasks to OS
processes and implements a reference monitor (RM) that
intercepts every conduit I/O in the kernel. The RM maintains
a taint for every task (process) in the pipeline. This taint is
actually a policy that is always at least as restrictive as the
policies of all conduits that the task has read in the past.
When a task opens a conduit for reading, the RM intercepts
to check whether the taint on the task is already more
restrictive than the policy of the conduit. If so, it does nothing
further. If not, it intersects the current taint of the task with the
policy of the conduit. When a task opens a conduit for writing,
the RM intercepts to first check the update rule of the conduit.
Next, it checks the declassification conditions in the taint of the
task, which may relax the taint, and then checks whether the
(possibly relaxed) taint is at least as permissive as the policy
of the conduit being written. These checks on conduit opens
ensure that, modulo declassification, the policies of conduits
downstream of a conduit f are always more restrictive than
f’s policy. As a result, the restrictions of f’s policy cannot be
“lost” on data derived downstream.
The RM enforces policies on egress conduits connected to
end-users by direct checks. For example, if an egress conduit’s
read policy says that only Alice can read, then the RM ensures
that the egress conduit is actually connected to Alice by
verifying the public key that authenticates the connection.
As mentioned above, despite its efficiency compared to
older solutions, Thoth still has significant overhead with
respect to the system’s throughput. This overhead has two
dominant sources.
1) Interception of every conduit open by the RM to check
taints and declassification conditions is expensive. In
Thoth, every interception involves a context switch to
a dedicated process that hosts the RM.
2) Once a user-facing task has served private data to a user,
that task cannot serve a different user without shedding
its previous taint. To shed that taint cleanly, the task must
be reset to a clean state. The usual way of doing this
is to re-exec the process hosting the task. Re-execing
is expensive. Since taint must be shed only once per
user session, the amortized cost of re-execing reduces
with increase in session length, but it is still significant
even for moderate session lengths (4-8 user queries per
session) in Thoth.
B. SHAI: Key ideas
SHAI is a re-design of Thoth with two key ideas to mitigate
most of Thoth’s overhead. First, SHAI adds to Thoth a new
offline phase that does most of the work of the RM ahead-
of-time, thus significantly reducing the need to intercept I/O.
Second, SHAI uses a different implementation of tasks that
allows for much faster state reset. End-to-end, the offline phase
reduces the overhead on each user request to near-zero in
the common case, while the change to the implementation
of tasks significantly reduces the overhead on user session
establishment.
a) Eliminating RM interceptions: SHAI eliminates the
need for runtime interception of most conduit accesses using
a periodic, ahead-of-time, offline analysis (OA). During the
OA, SHAI makes (and caches) policy checks on the reads and
writes that the system is likely to make in later executions of
the pipeline. For this, the OA takes as input a list of tasks
in the pipeline, what conduits each task is likely to read and
write during the pipeline’s execution, an estimate of the task’s
anticipated taint at runtime and the policies of all conduits.
With the exception of the policies, these inputs are not trusted
for policy enforcement; getting some of them wrong only
results in a proportionally higher overhead at runtime. All
inputs can be easily determined by running the pipeline in
a test environment, by monitoring the production system, or
by a simple manual analysis.
The OA simulates the checks that the Thoth RM would
make for each conduit access specified in the inputs (but
without actually running the pipeline). Later, at runtime, each
task runs in a OS sandbox, which allows conduit accesses that
were already checked by the OA without faulting into the RM.
These accesses run at native speed. In the rare case that an
access not foreseen by the OA occurs, the OS sandbox faults
into the RM, which makes the same policy checks that Thoth
would make.
Our current prototype uses FreeBSD’s capability system
(Capsicum) [18] (with small modifications) for the OS sand-
box. Capability checks in Capsicum are highly optimized and
incur nearly zero overhead. This, coupled with the OA, reduces
the overhead of I/O interception to nearly zero in the common
case.
While this idea is conceptually simple, it has several nu-
anced details that we explain in Section III. First, a task’s abil-
ity to make certain accesses may depend on parameters whose
exact values will be known only at runtime, e.g., which user
has authenticated remotely, which geographic region the user
has connected from (to enforce legal, region-based content
blacklisting), etc. To permit the OA to take these parameters
into account, the anticipated values of these parameters can be
coded within the task description (specifically, within the task’s
taint). These anticipated values are then verified at runtime,
but only once when the task starts running. In practice, this
amounts to checking these parameters once per user session,
not on every conduit access, which makes the checks efficient.
Second, a task’s ability to make accesses may depend on
meta-data such as friends lists being in a certain state (e.g.,
Alice can access Bob’s friends-only content only while she is
Bob’s friend). This state may change after the OA has finished,
thus (partially) invalidating the OA’s analysis. Consequently,
the OA must inform the RM of such meta-data dependencies
and the RM must track runtime updates to meta-data occurring
in the dependencies to avoid policy violations.
b) Reducing the cost of task reset: The need to reset
a user-facing task between sessions of two different users is
fundamental to coarse-grained taint tracking and cannot be
eliminated entirely. To reduce the cost of this reset signif-
icantly, SHAI relies on a recent OS primitive called light-
weight contexts (lwCs) [13] to rollback the state of a user-
facing task to a clean state efficiently. lwCs support multiple
tasks with separate address spaces and file descriptor tables
within the same process. Resetting an lwC’s state resets only
the “essential” elements (the memory mappings and open file
descriptors) and is faster than re-execing an entire process.
This cuts down overheads significantly compared to Thoth.
As an added benefit, the use of lwCs also allows imple-
menting the RM itself in a lwC, in place of a separate process
(as in Thoth). This reduces the cost of interception for the few
reads/writes that fault into the RM in SHAI from a standard
OS context switch to a lwC switch, which is cheaper since
it does not involve scheduling delays. We describe lwCs and
their use in SHAI in Section IV.
C. Threat model
Like Thoth and almost all other work on information
flow control, the goal of SHAI is to ensure that policies on
ingress conduits are enforced despite bugs in the system’s
implementation. The concern is inadvertent data leaks, not
extraction or stealing of information by malicious adversaries.
As such, low-level vulnerabilities (buffer overflows, control
flow hijacks, etc.) are not a concern. Implicit flows and side-
channels like timing channels would, in principle, be a concern
in this setting, but SHAI focuses only on the larger, more
prominent risks from explicit leaks of data.
Since SHAI is primarily a userspace system, the kernel
(including its sandboxing mechanism) is trusted. SHAI’s in-
tegral components—the RM and the OA—are both trusted.
Policies on ingress nodes are assumed to represent privacy
requirements correctly and all meta-data (e.g., friends lists) on
which their interpretation depends is assumed to be accurate.
Policies of internal conduits can be chosen arbitrarily.
Getting these wrong can block legitimate data flows in the
pipeline, but cannot violate policies of ingress conduits. Any
input provided to the OA, with the exception of the policies of
conduits, is not trusted. Getting these inputs wrong can only
impact performance and/or functionality, not policy enforce-
ment. However, policies of conduits provided to the OA must
be the same as those used by the RM.
III. SHAI DESIGN
SHAI’s design consists primarily of two components—the
offline analysis (OA) and a runtime sandbox and reference
monitor (RM). We use Thoth’s policy language (with very
minor extensions) for representing policies. In the following,
we first present a running example that we use to illustrate var-
ious concepts and that also forms the basis of our evaluation.
We then describe the OA and the runtime system.
A. Example: Search pipeline
Our running example, called Sys-E, is the same as that used
in Thoth’s evaluation. Sys-E models the search component
of a typical user data-driven system such as a modern social
platform.
Sys-E indexes a corpus of heterogeneous data consisting of
public documents (modeling public content on the WWW),
documents private to individual users (modeling content such
as emails and individual calendars), and semi-private docu-
ments shared among stipulated subsets of users (modeling
content such as social media posts that are accessible only to
friends or friends of friends). Each piece of content is stored
in a separate file. These files are the ingress conduits of Sys-E.
The system supports friends lists of users, which are used by
the policy enforcement mechanism. The system also has lists
of blacklisted documents which should not be visible to users
connecting from specific geographic regions to support legal
blocking of content.
The first task in Sys-E’s pipeline is a data indexer that builds
an index mapping keywords to documents containing those
keywords. This task consumes all the content files above and
produces the index, which is also stored in files. Note that the
data indexer is mostly offline; it only runs periodically.
The next task in the pipeline is a search engine, which
accepts a user query (a set of keywords) over a pipe from a
user-facing front-end task (described next), looks up the index,
and responds back to the front-end with a list of documents
that contain those keywords. Technically, the search engine
does not return a list of documents but instead passes open
file descriptors for the matching documents over a pipe.
The last part of our pipeline is the front-end, which hosts
a web server through which remote users interact with Sys-
E. For every incoming user connection, Sys-E spawns a new
user-specific worker task, which authenticates the user (with
the user’s public key), and then accepts search queries from
the user. It forwards each search query to the search engine,
then reads each of the matching documents returned by the
search engine to extract a snippet, composes all the snippets
into a set of “results”, personalizes the results using stored
preferences of the connected user, and inserts advertisements
to generate revenue. It then returns the resulting page to the
user. Note that this last part of the pipeline is a not a single
task, but consists of a separate task for every connected user.
Ingress conduit policies: The read rules of the ingress
conduits specify expected confidentiality requirements: Public
documents have an all permissive read rule (anyone can read
them), Alice’s private files have a read rule that allows access
to Alice only, and Alice’s semi-private files have a read rule
that allows access only to Alice and her friends (or friends of
friends).
Declassification rules are more interesting. Note that the
indexer consumes the private content of all users and, hence,
in principle, its output (the index) should not be accessible
to any user. Since the search engine consumes the index, its
output (file descriptors of documents that match a user query)
must also not be accessible to any user. This effectively means
that the end-user will not be able to see any output from the
pipeline!
To work around this, we relax the policies of all indexed
files. Specifically, the declassify rules of all indexed files allow
a complete declassification into any conduit that can only
transfer open file descriptors but no other content. The pipe
from the search engine to a worker task is such a conduit.
This allows the search engine to return open file descriptors of
matching documents to worker tasks, and allows the pipeline
to work as expected. (An additional check in the kernel,
described in Section IV, ensures that the worker task can
only receive descriptors that it could have opened itself; this
prevents a buggy search engine from sending a descriptor for
Alice’s private file to Bob’s worker task.)
The declassification policies of indexed content also have
additional clauses for enforcing region-specific censorship. A
user’s profile (including preferences) has a policy that allows
access only to the user. We elide the details of these policies
here. The paper on Thoth describes these policies in detail.
B. The offline analysis (OA)
As its name suggests, the OA is an offline process that
runs periodically on the side, not within the actual system
pipeline. The goal of the OA is to check, ahead of time,
which conduits each task in the pipeline can read and write.
Accesses that check successfully in the OA do not have to be
intercepted in the pipeline at runtime, which reduces runtime
overhead. To improve efficiency, the OA should be configured
to check as many accesses as possible ahead of time. Of
course, not all accesses can be checked ahead of time; these
accesses are subject to policy checks by the RM as described
in Section III-C. Accesses to conduits that do not exist when
the OA runs, including pipes, fall in this category. In a properly
configured system, these should be the only accesses that are
checked at runtime.
a) OA’s inputs: The OA takes the following parameters
as inputs:
1) A list of tasks on which to run the OA. If a task’s ac-
cesses depend on runtime parameters such as the identity
of the user the task will serve, a separate instance of
the task should be listed for every combination of these
parameters.1
2) For each task, lists of conduits whose reads and writes
by this task have to be checked.
3) The steady-state taint of each task. This is explained
below.
4) The policies of all conduits in the system.
5) Any policy-relevant meta-data such as Sys-E’s friends
lists and region-specific content blacklists.
The taint of a task is a policy that the RM associates to the
task at runtime. This policy is always at least as restrictive
as the policies of all conduits that the task has read. SHAI
enforces this policy on all data that is output by the task
and all data that is derived downstream from this output data.
The relevance of the taint is that it allows a local check to
determine if it is safe to allow a task to read a conduit: The
read is safe if the task’s taint is at least as restrictive as the
conduit’s policy since, then, the conduit’s policy is guaranteed
to be enforced downstream. Input (3) to the OA asks for the
runtime steady-state taint of each task.
All inputs (1)–(5) can be determined fairly easily. (1)
follows from the schema of the pipeline and, for parametrized
tasks, from the possible values of the parameters (e.g., the list
of registered users).
The lists in (2) should include as many runtime accesses
of the task as possible. These accesses can be determined
either by testing, monitoring the production pipeline or man-
ual analysis. For simple pipelines, manual analysis may be
straightforward. This works, for instance, for Sys-E: The
indexer reads all indexable content and writes the index; the
search engine reads the index and indexed content but writes to
a pipe that is created only at runtime, so the write is irrelevant
for the OA; a user’s worker task should read only content that
is accessible to the user (the user’s own private content, content
shared by her friends with their friends, public content, etc.)
and it writes to a network connection that is also created only
at runtime, so this write is also irrelevant for the OA.
(3) can be determined by simple manual analysis, testing or
monitoring of the production pipeline. For example, in the Sys-
E pipeline, ignoring region-specific censorship for simplicity,
the taints are fairly straightforward. (a) Indexer and search en-
gine: Disallow any reads, but eventually allow declassification
into a conduit that can only transfer file descriptors, (b) User
X’s worker task: Only X can read.
(4) and (5) should be readily available in the system’s meta-
data.
SHAI includes a dedicated language to represent (1)–(5); we
elide the details of the syntax here.
1The identity of the user is not the only possible policy-relevant runtime
parameter although, for simplicity, we discuss only this parameter here.
Another parameter that our implementation of Sys-E uses is the geographic
region from which the user connects; we use this parameter to enforce region-
specific legal blacklisting of content.
b) OA’s operation: The OA checks relevant policies for
every conduit read and write mentioned in input (2) and deter-
mines which reads and writes are policy compliant and which
are not. For simplicity, we first describe the checks assuming
that there are no declassification conditions in policies. We
then describe the changes needed to handle declassification
conditions.
In the absence of declassification conditions, the checks that
the OA makes are conceptually straightforward. A task T can
read a conduit f if f’s declassify rule (the rule that governs
the use of f’s data downstream) is at least as permissive as T’s
taint. This ensures that f’s data remains protected downstream
in accordance with f’s policy. Dually, a task T can write a
conduit f if f’s declassify rule is at least as restrictive as T’s
taint. This ensures that T’s taint is respected on all of T’s
outputs downstream. For a write, the OA additionally checks
that f’s update rule is satisfied.
When policies have declassification conditions, the check
for reads remains unchanged. However, the policy comparison
check for writes is more elaborate. The OA first checks if
any declassification conditions in T’s taint are satisfied. If
so, it creates a list of T’s updated taints, with one taint for
every satisfied declassification condition. If not, it creates a
list with only T’s current taint. The write is deemed okay if
f’s declassify rule is more restrictive than any of the taints in
the list just created.
As an example, suppose that the OA wants to validate a
write to conduit f by task T when T’s taint is “only Alice
can read until the clock time exceeds midnight on December
31, 2017” and f’s declassify rule is all permissive. (T’s taint
allows a declassification of Alice’s private content at the end
of 2017.) In this case, the declassification condition in T’s
taint is “until the clock time exceeds midnight on December
31, 2017”. So, the OA checks whether the clock time is past
midnight on December 31, 2017. If this is the case, then T’s
resulting taint imposes no restrictions, so the write is okay. If
this is not the case, then the write is not okay.
These conceptually straightforward checks are more nu-
anced when they involve meta-data that can change over time.
Consider the case of Alice’s worker task in Sys-E reading a
document with the policy “accessible to Bob’s friends only”. In
this case, the policy check above will succeed only if Alice is
in Bob’s friends list. Suppose that Alice is in Bob’s friends list
when the OA runs. Now note that, in the future, the validity of
this check is conditional on Alice remaining in Bob’s friends
list. If Bob unfriends Alice, this validity is lost.
Consequently, with each access that it successfully validates,
the OA also returns a list of conditions on the system state
under which the access was validated. We call these conditions
the state conditions of the access. One general state condition
is that the policy of the conduit must be what it was when the
OA ran. At runtime, the RM checks these conditions before
using the OA’s validations as explained in Section III-C.
Finally, the validity of the accesses of a task may depend
on parameters that can be determined at runtime only. For
example, in Sys-E, a worker task serving user X should be
able to read only conduits that X is allowed to read, but the
identity X will be known only at runtime. In the OA, this is
handled by executing the analysis for all possible instances of
the parameter (X in this case). Technically, the OA is given
a separate instance of the task for every possible value of the
parameter. Thus, in Sys-E, there is one instance of the worker
task for every registered user—there is a task called “Alice’s
worker”, another called “Bob’s worker”, etc. The specific value
of the parameters for a task instance are coded in the taint of
the instance. In Sys-E, the taint of Alice’s worker is “Only
Alice can read downstream”, while that of Bob’s worker is
“Only Bob can read downstream”. With these precise taints,
the OA validates all accesses for the specific instances of the
task. At runtime, the task must register with the RM as the
correct instance, else it won’t be allowed to communicate with
the connected user. Thus, safety is always maintained.
c) Formal description of the OA’s algorithm: Algo-
rithm 1 summarizes the work of the OA. The algorithm does
exactly what is described above. The function isAsRestr(r1,
r2) checks that policy rule r1 is at least as restrictive as r2 and
returns a boolean indicating whether this is the case (okay)
and, if so, what parts of the system state were relevant to this
determination (the state conditions, conds). The function isAs-
RestrWithDeclass is similar but it also applies declassification
within r2. The function policyEval evaluates a policy rule.
All these functions are based on similar functions in Thoth.
Thoth uses these functions at runtime, not ahead-of-time; we
modified the functions to track which parts of the system state
are relevant to the result.
The output of the OA is a list of tuples of the forms (read,
T, f, conds) and (write, T, f, conds) indicating that task T
can respectively read or write conduit f if the state conditions
conds hold on the system state.
d) Using the OA in practice: It may seem that the total
work of the OA is enormous: For every task and every conduit
that the task may potentially access, the access should be
validated ahead-of-time by the OA for runtime efficiency. In
the context of Sys-E, for example, assuming 10 million users
and, on average, 1,000 pieces of content accessible to each
user, this amounts to 10 billion checks just for the user-specific
worker tasks every time the OA runs. This sounds intractable.
In reality, not all these checks are necessary. We describe
two obvious optimizations. First, the OA’s checks only ex-
amine the policies of conduits, not the conduits themselves.
Consequently, if a set of conduits share the same policy, then
it is safe to run the OA on only one of those conduits and
transfer the OA’s result to all other conduits in the set. This
optimization is quite useful. For example, all of Alice’s private
content (like her emails) will have the same policy. Similarly,
all the uncensored public content on the WWW has the same
policy (it is accessible to everyone).
Second, the OA results remain valid until policies or policy-
relevant meta-data change. Consequently, there is no need to
include the content of inactive users in the OA very often.
The OA can also be run on a specific user’s content on-
Algorithm 1 OA’s algorithm
Inputs: (1)–(5) as described in text. In particular, (2) is a list
of expected reads of the form (read, T, f) and a list of
expected writes of the form (write, T, f).
Output: A list of tuples of the form ([read | write], T, f,
conds), meaning that T can read or write f if conditions
conds hold on the system state.
1: output ← ∅
2: for all (read, T, f) in input (2) do
3: pol ← f’s policy in input (4)
4: taint← T’s taint in input (3)
5: (okay, conds) ← isAsRestr(taint, pol.declassify)
6: if okay then
7: add (read, T, f, conds) to output
8: end if
9: end for
10: for all (write, T, f) in input (2) do
11: pol ← f’s policy in input (4)
12: taint← T’s taint in input (3)
13: (okay1, conds1)←
isAsRestrWithDeclass(pol.declassify, taint)
14: (okay2, conds2)← policyEval(pol.update)
15: if (okay1 && okay2) then
16: add (write, T, f, conds1 ∪ conds2) to output
17: end if
18: end for
19: return output
demand, e.g., when the system detects that the user has become
sufficiently active.
We quantify the cost of the OA on a realistic but simulated
workload in Section V.
C. Runtime monitor and OS sandbox
SHAI’s runtime infrastructure consists of two components.
First, we rely on an existing OS light-weight capability sand-
box2 to encapsulate every runtime task in the data retrieval
system’s processing pipeline. The sandbox is configured to
allow all accesses that have been validated by the OA without
any further interception. Second, a SHAI reference monitor
(RM) runs in userspace, isolated within a lwC. It serves two
purposes: It configures the sandbox when a task starts and it
validates any accesses that were not validated by the OA ahead
of time by making the required policy checks. In the follow-
ing, we describe these two components somewhat abstractly.
Section IV describes a concrete prototype implementation of
the RM and the sandbox on FreeBSD.
a) Task registration: When a new task starts, its access
to all conduits is blocked by the OS sandbox; the only thing
the task can do is talk to the RM. To get access to conduits, the
task must register with the RM by specifying which previously
2FreeBSD Capsicum with minimal extensions in our prototype
offline analyzed task it represents. For example, in Sys-E, the
task may register as the indexer, the search engine or user X’s
worker for any known user X. The RM records the choice and
the taint provided during the OA for the specified task.
Next, the RM looks up the last output of the OA for the
specified task to determine which accesses for the task have
already been validated. For each tuple (read, T, f, conds)
or (write, T, f, conds) in the output, the RM checks the
state conditions conds, and creates a list of all conduits and
permissions for which the conditions hold. It gives this list
to the OS sandbox, which subsequently allows the task these
accesses directly.
For reasons of efficiency, our prototype implements the
checking of state conditions differently. There, the RM al-
ways maintains up-to-date lists of each task’s valid accesses
by tracking changes to meta-data on which state conditions
depend (e.g., friends lists of region-specific blacklists in Sys-
E), and eagerly re-evaluating state conditions when the meta-
data changes. As a result, task registration is very fast. The
rationale for this implementation choice is straightforward: In
online systems like social networks, changes to meta-data like
friends lists are far less frequent than task registrations (which
happen once per user session), so tying the expensive step
of checking state conditions to meta-data changes rather than
task registrations results in less overhead.
Registering incorrectly, e.g., registering as the indexer in
place of Alice’s worker or as Alice’s worker in place of
Bob’s worker, either maliciously or accidentally, cannot cause
a policy violation in SHAI. However, doing so may cause
expected accesses to be denied or more accesses to fault into
the RM thus slowing down the task.
b) Conduit access: After a task has registered with the
RM, it can open conduits for reading and writing. Every
conduit open call passes through the kernel as usual. If the
conduit and the mode (read/write) in which it is being opened
were provided to the OS sandbox as a valid access during the
task’s registration, the kernel just allows the call. This is the
fast path and it should apply to most conduit accesses in a
properly configured system.
If, on the other hand, the OS sandbox does not know that
the specific access is valid, then it transfers control to the
RM. The RM then makes the same policy checks that the OA
would have made for the corresponding operation (read/write).
The only difference is that the RM does not generate any
state conditions conds; it just checks them immediately. If the
checks succeed, the open call is allowed, else it is denied.
c) Meta-data changes after a task registers: As ex-
plained above, the OS sandbox is informed of a task’s pre-
validated accesses when the task registers. A relevant question
is what to do when a subsequent meta-data change invalidates
some of these accesses. There are two choices here: Either the
invalidated accesses can be revoked in the OS sandbox or they
can be left as is. SHAI chooses the latter option since revoking
a permission from the sandbox is costly.
This option is also secure since any access that the task does
after the invalidation could also have been done before the
invalidation to the same effect. An exception to this argument
occurs when read access is to be invalidated before the conduit
is updated. In this case, continuing the read access will allow
the task to obtain the conduit’s updated content which it
could not have obtained had the read access been revoked
immediately. To avoid such cases (when they are really a
concern), the system should be configured to store updated
content in new conduits (e.g., by versioning files). This is
consistent with systems like online social networks where
existing content is updated relatively infrequently (although
fresh content is added quite regularly).
d) Increasing task taints: In most cases, a task’s runtime
taint is fixed when the task registers and remains the same
throughout its execution. In some cases, however, the task may
wish to increase its taint (i.e., make it more restrictive) during
its execution. For example, this is necessary if the task wishes
to read sensitive content after writing to a public conduit. In
this case, the task must start with a public taint and acquire
the taint of the sensitive content afterward.
SHAI allows a task to increase its taint at runtime as
follows.3 At any point, a running task may re-register as a
new offline analyzed task whose taint is higher than the task’s
current taint. In addition to making all the checks that would
be made during task registration, SHAI also checks that the
policies of any conduits to which the task has open write
handles are more restrictive than the task’s new taint. This
check is necessary to prevent leaks of data that the task reads
under the new taint. If this check fails, the re-registration is
disallowed.
e) The overall cost of runtime interception: The overall
cost of runtime interception in SHAI is generally very low. For
interactive pipelines such as Sys-E’s RM interception happens
only a few times per user session (not per user query). For
instance, in Sys-E, only four RM interceptions are needed
per session: (a) To register the worker task that serves the
session (this interception also validates the policies on the pipe
that connects the worker to the search engine), (b) When the
worker accepts the user’s connection, (c) When the session is
authenticated, and (d) At the end of the session, to reset the
worker task to a clean state for the next user.
IV. SHAI PROTOTYPE
Our SHAI prototype runs on FreeBSD and relies on
FreeBSD’s kernel capability support (Capsicum) [18] and
light-weight contexts (lwCs) [13] for sandboxing and isolation,
respectively. We briefly describe these primitives.
Capsicum: Capsicum is a OS sandbox to control a
process’ access to global namespaces including the file system.
Capsicum introduces a new mode of process execution, the
capability mode. A process in this mode can open new files
(and, more broadly, make specific syscalls) only if it has been
granted the capabilities to do so before it entered the capability
mode. SHAI uses Capsicum directly to implement its OS
3On the other hand, reducing a task’s taint at runtime is not safe as this
allows the task to leak previously read information. Therefore, SHAI and all
other coarse-grained taint tracking systems disallow reducing a task’s taint.
sandbox: Every task runs in capability mode with capabilities
to make only the accesses that were certified by the OA.
Light-weight contexts (lwCs): lwCs are an OS abstraction
that allow multiple tasks with separate address spaces and
separate file descriptor tables to co-exist in the same process.
lwCs are orthogonal to execution threads; a thread can switch
between lwCs. A lwC switch is more efficient than a process
switch since the former has no scheduler delays.
SHAI maps tasks one-one to lwCs. The RM also runs
inside a privileged lwC. The kernel is configured to redirect
any syscall outside a task’s capability set to the RM lwC.
As compared to a design that uses processes for the same
purposes, this design allows for faster switching between tasks
and the RM, and for faster resetting of tainted worker tasks at
the end of user sessions by avoiding scheduler delays.
a) Application life cycle: An application is loaded with
a customized script that first initializes the RM lwC in each
process. Next, it initializes application tasks in separate lwCs
and confining them with Capsicum’s capability mode. Then,
the RM is invoked to register each application task, giving it
the capabilities to access anything that was already certified
by the OA and whose state conditions hold. Depending on the
type of a conduit, the capability to access it takes different
forms:
- Files: The task is given Capsicum capabilities to a small
set of directories that contain hard links to all files that
should be accessible to the task. (These directories and
the hard links are created offline at the end of the OA and
kept up-to-date by the RM as state conditions change.)
- Key-value (KV) tuples: For these, the RM relies on KV
filters. The RM opens a socket to the KV store and installs
a KV filter that limits access to only those tuples that are
accessible to the task. It then gives this open socket to
the task.
During its execution, an application task makes most conduit
accesses directly using the capabilities described above. For
the few accesses that are beyond these capabilities, it faults
into the RM, which makes policy checks.
b) Capsicum modifications: To support Sys-E and other
similar search-based pipelines, we made two modifications
to Capsicum. First, we modified Capsicum to allow a pipe
without read and write permissions to be used to transfer open
file descriptors but not data. In Sys-E, such a pipe is used
by the search engine to return file descriptors for documents
matching the user query to the front-end’s worker task. Since
data transfers on the pipe are forbidden, even a buggy search
engine cannot accidentally send private data to the worker.
Second, we modified Capsicum to allow a task in capability
mode to transfer file descriptors to another task in capability
mode only if the receiving task already has access capabilities
on all conduits referenced by the file descriptors. With this
feature in place, Capsicum prevents a buggy search engine
from transferring a descriptor for Bob’s private file to a front-
end worker task connected to Alice. To implement this feature,
we modified Capsicum to maintain every task’s capabilities in
a binary lookup tree. When a file descriptor is transferred to a
task, Capsicum looks up the binary tree for a capability to the
conduit referenced by the descriptor. This lookup’s complexity
is logarithmic in the number of distinct capabilities the task
has. In Sys-E, only the front-end tasks receive file descriptors
and these tasks have very few capabilities (at most 5), so the
lookup is very fast.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we present results of an experimental eval-
uation of our SHAI prototype. In particular, we measure the
overhead of policy enforcement in the data retrieval system
Sys-E described in III-A. We instantiated this system with
the widely-used Apache Lucene as the search engine [1]. All
experiments were performed on Dell R410 servers, each with
2 Intel Xeon X5650 2.66 GHz 6 core CPUs, 48GB main
memory, running FreeBSD 11.0 (x86-64) with support for
light-weight contexts (lwC) [13] and Lucene version 4.7 with a
minor modification to allow it to run in Capsicum’s capability
mode.4 The prototype uses OpenSSL v1.0.2h. The servers are
connected to Cisco Nexus 7018 switches with 1Gbit Ethernet
links, which offer enough network bandwidth for all our
experiments. Each server has a 1TB Seagate ST31000424SS
disk formatted under UFS, which contains the OS installation
and a 258GB static snapshot of English language Wikipedia
articles from 2008 [20].
Experimental setup. In the following experiments, we
compare the performance of SHAI to two systems; (i) a system
that does not enforce policies (BASELINE), and (ii) a system
that enforces policies via pure dynamic analysis (DYNAMIC).
We give more details about DYNAMIC in the following.
In DYNAMIC, each task has a current taint, which represents
the combined policies of all the conduits the task has read.
A task’s taint can become more restrictive as the task reads
more conduits. To enforce policy, a task’s writes must (i)
satisfy the update rule of the destination conduit’s policy, and
(ii) satisfy the declassification conditions of the task’s current
taint. DYNAMIC is very similar to Thoth; for fair comparison,
our DYNAMIC implementation, like SHAI, takes advantage
of lwCs and Capsicum for efficient in-process isolation and
sandboxing. This yields better performance than the original
Thoth prototype, which isolates each user session and the
reference monitor in a separate process.
A process in DYNAMIC, like SHAI, can have multiple
Capsicum-sandboxed user lwCs (each terminates a user con-
nection), and a privileged monitor lwC. Conceptually, the RM
intercepts all conduit open calls and writes to perform taint
tracking and dynamic policy checks. As in Thoth, we optimize
taint tracking by not invoking the RM during open calls and
instead logging such calls in the kernel. During a write, the
RM is invoked, it checks the open call trace to update the task
taints and then performs the policy check for the write. To
4In SHAI, all tasks, including the Lucene indexer, run in capability mode. In
this mode, the syscall OPEN is disallowed by Capsicum, so we had to modify
Lucene to use OPENAT instead. We found that OPENAT is faster than OPEN
so, to remain fair, we use the modified Lucene in the two other configurations
that we compare against as well.
summarize, DYNAMIC and SHAI are identical architecturally:
A process has multiple Capsicum-sandboxed user lwCs and
a privileged monitor lwC. Both systems also enforce the
same policies. However, unlike SHAI, which pushes most
policy evaluation overhead to the offline analysis, DYNAMIC
performs pure dynamic IFC: the underlying kernel intercepts
I/O and directs it to the reference monitor, which in turn tracks
taint and performs policy evaluation at runtime.
A. Search throughput
First, we measure SHAI’s overhead on search throughput.
We drive the experiment with the following workload. We
simulate a population of 40,000 users. Each user is assigned
a friend list consisting of 100 randomly chosen other users,
subject to the constraint that the friendship relationship is
symmetric. Each document in the Wikipedia corpus is assigned
either a public, private, or friends-only policy in the proportion
50/30/20%, respectively. Private and friends-only documents
are assigned to a user picked uniformly at random from the
population. A total of 1.1% of the corpus is censored in some
region. A censored document’s policy allows declassification
to an external user only if the destination’s blacklist file does
not blacklist the document.
In this experiment, 24 concurrent users issue queries
in parallel. We use query strings based on the popularity
of Wikipedia page accesses during one hour on April 1,
2012 [19]. Specifically, we search for the titles of the top 20K
visited articles and assign each of the queries randomly to one
of the users. User sessions run for lengths 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or
32 queries. Additionally, we report the throughput when users
maintain their sessions for the duration of the experiment (20k
queries).
In our setup, two server machines execute a Lucene instance
with different index shards. The front-end submits a search
request to one Lucene instance, which in turn forwards the
request to the other instance and merges the results from both
shards. To maximize the performance of the baseline and fully
expose the policy enforcement overheads, the index shards and
parts of the corpus relevant to our query stream are pre-loaded
into the servers’ main memory caches, resulting in a CPU-
bound workload. To ensure load balance, we partitioned the
index into two shards of 22GB and 33GB, chosen to achieve
approximately equal query throughput.
Table I shows the average throughput over 40 runs of
20K queries each, for BASELINE, DYNAMIC, and SHAI. The
standard deviation over the 40 runs was below 0.87% across
all configurations.
The key result is that SHAI’s static analysis reduces the
runtime enforcement overhead to near zero for sufficiently
long session lengths (0.1% at 16 queries and 0.02% at 20k
queries). The DYNAMIC system, which relies on pure run-
time enforcement but is otherwise equivalent, has a runtime
overhead of approximately 2.5% for large session lengths.5
5A 2.5% overhead may seem small; but increasing the peak capacity of a
large datacenter by 2.5% to account for it has a substantial cost!
BASELINE DYNAMIC SHAI
Q/S Avg. Avg. overhead Avg. overhead
1 309.36 287.04 7.21% 294.70 4.74%
2 313.90 298.29 4.97% 305.60 2.64%
4 316.49 304.58 3.76% 312.54 1.25%
8 317.60 308.07 3.00% 316.17 0.45%
16 318.66 309.27 2.95% 318.34 0.10%
32 318.95 310.11 2.77% 318.64 0.10%
20k 319.13 311.10 2.52% 319.08 0.02%
TABLE I: Average search throughput in queries per second.
Standard deviation was less than 0.87% from the average in
all cases. First column indicates the session length (queries
per session – Q/S).
Even for short session lengths, SHAI’s runtime overhead is
substantially lower than DYNAMIC’s.
In DYNAMIC and SHAI, the front-end creates a new lwC
for every incoming user session. In SHAI, the monitor lwC
additionally performs the required runtime checks associated
with the connected user’s taint before granting access capa-
bilities. The overheads of setting up new sessions (creating
lwCs and performing runtime checks) dominate the policy
enforcement overhead for short sessions. At one query per
session, DYNAMIC incurs a 7.21% overhead, whereas SHAI in-
curs 4.74%. Here, SHAI outperforms DYNAMIC since (i) SHAI
performs fewer (runtime) checks compared to DYNAMIC’s full
policy evaluation for all documents accessed per query, and
(ii) DYNAMIC tracks the search engine’s taint and intercepts
its writes to evaluate them against the search engine’s current
taint, whereas the search engine’s accesses within its capability
set are not intercepted in SHAI. Furthermore, as the session
length increases, the cost of SHAI’s per-session setup costs and
runtime checks amortize over the session’s queries, whereas
DYNAMIC performs full policy evaluation for each query.
At session length 20k, SHAI incurs 0.02% overhead, sig-
nificantly better than DYNAMIC’s 2.52% overhead. SHAI’s
remaining runtime overhead is due to the kernel’s capability
checks; in particular, when the search engine attempts to
send file descriptors corresponding to the search results, the
kernel checks that the front-end has existing access capabilities
for these descriptors. This check is efficient; its runtime
complexity is logarithmic in the number of distinct (directory)
capabilities the receiving front-end has. In our prototype, a
front-end that satisfies runtime checks acquires few directory
capabilities6, making the check light-weight.
In the previous experiment, all users connected from the
regions that were anticipated during the offline analysis. To
quantify the overhead of runtime checks required when run-
time conditions deviate from those expected, we next perform
an experiment in which we vary the proportion of users who
connect from regions different from those assumed during
6One on the connected user’s hard links directory, another on named pipes
to submit queries to the search engine, and three on directories with public
documents.
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Fig. 2: Average search throughput in queries per second
of 24 concurrent users, with sessions of length 8 queries.
We included BASELINE and DYNAMIC performance (upper
and lower lines, respectively) for reference. Error bars show
standard deviation.
offline analysis. Figure 2 shows the average throughput over 40
runs of 20K queries each. The error bars indicate the standard
deviation over the 40 runs, which was less than 0.72% in all
cases. We report the average throughput for sessions of length
8 queries, but the following conclusions regarding the relative
overheads of SHAI and DYNAMIC hold across all session
lengths.
With 100% of users connecting from the expected region
(i.e., all user sessions satisfy the runtime checks associated
with their taint), SHAI performs 316.17 Q/s (0.45% overhead
over BASELINE), as in Table I. As the proportion of users who
connect from their expected regions decreases, SHAI’s perfor-
mance declines approximately linearly and approaches that of
DYNAMIC, but never gets worse. Even when all users connect
from unexpected regions, DYNAMIC incurs more overhead
than SHAI because it intercepts the search engine’s writes to
evaluate them against the search engine’s current taint. SHAI’s
throughput degrades similarly if other runtime variables are
mispredicted. For instance, it declines approximately linearly
with the proportion of policies changed and the proportion
of new content added since the last offline analysis (not
shown due to space constraints). This result shows that SHAI’s
benefits decline gracefully with the accuracy and freshness of
the offline analysis.
B. Scaling search throughput
The throughput of a single Lucene search engine is rela-
tively modest, which raises the question of how much overhead
SHAI might impose on a much faster system. In the next set
of experiments, we study SHAI’s overhead in a replicated
search engine configuration, and in a configuration with a
hypothetical search engine that has much higher throughput
than Lucene.
Replication. We performed the throughput experiment on
a replicated setup. In this experiment, four server machines
execute Lucene instances, where each index shard is replicated
on two servers. A front-end submits a search request to a
lightly loaded Lucene instance, which in turn forwards the
request to another lightly loaded instance processing the other
shard and merges the results from both shards. Here, 48 users
issue queries in parallel, users maintain their sessions for
the duration of the experiment, and we measured the aver-
age throughput over 40 runs, each 20K queries. BASELINE,
DYNAMIC, and SHAI all achieved an average throughput of
almost exactly twice (within 0.152%) the respective through-
put reported in Table I at session length 20k. This shows that
SHAI (like DYNAMIC) scales linearly as the search engine is
replicated.
Hypothetical fast search. To study SHAI’s overhead in a
hypothetical data retrieval systems that serve tens of thousands
of search requests per second, we replaced the Lucence search
engine with one that picks results randomly from the set of
documents accessible by the user who issues the query. We
measure SHAI’s overhead over (a) a dummy search engine
that performs over 3K Q/s (SETUP3K), and (b) a dummy
search engine that performs over 30K Q/s (SETUP30K). The
dummy search engine busy waits to consume a fixed number
of CPU cycles in SETUP3K before returning the search results,
whereas it returns the results immediately without busy waiting
in SETUP30K . Note that SETUP30K represents an extreme
situation, shown here only to fully expose SHAI’s overheads;
we do not expect any realistic search engine to attain such
high per-node throughput.
In this experiment, a total of 56 concurrent users issue
queries in parallel to two server machines running the dummy
search engine. User sessions run for lengths 1, 4, 16, 64,
256, 1024, and 20k queries. Figure 3 shows the average
throughput at the different session lengths for SETUP3K and
SETUP30K (Figures 3a and 3b, respectively). We report the
average throughput over 10 runs, each of length 30 seconds.
Error bars show the standard deviation across the 10 runs,
which was below 0.9% in all cases.
At small session lengths, both SHAI and DYNAMIC have
high overheads due to the cost of creating lwCs to isolate user
sessions. As the session length increases, the cost of session
creation amortizes across queries in SHAI; the overheads are
only 0.37% and 1.2% at session length 20k, in 3a and 3b
respectively. These overheads are due to checking, at a high
rate, that the front-ends have existing capabilities over the
transferred file descriptors. On the other hand, DYNAMIC does
not scale beyond 2.39K and 7.76K Q/s in 3a and 3b, because
intercepting I/O to perform policy evaluation at runtime limits
performance. This result shows that SHAI can maintain low
overhead even in very high-performance data retrieval systems.
C. Search latency
We next measure SHAI’s overhead on query latency. For
this experiment, a user issues one query at a time and waits
until it receives a result before issuing another query. User
sessions run for lengths 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 or 4k queries.
Table II shows the average query latency across 5 runs of 4K
queries. Since SHAI’s overhead relies on satisfying the runtime
checks necessary to acquire capabilities, we report SHAI’s
performance when (i) the user logs in from a geographic
location different than the region used during offline analysis
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Fig. 3: Search throughput in (Q/s) of 56 concurrent users, at
different session lengths. Error bars show standard deviation.
Q/S BASELINE DYNAMIC SHAImispredict SHAI
1 36.013 38.071 37.314 36.345
2 36.007 37.843 37.122 36.108
4 36.005 37.742 37.084 36.037
8 35.981 37.719 37.021 36.008
16 35.939 37.657 36.916 35.955
32 35.928 37.599 36.904 35.941
4k 35.905 37.597 36.913 35.960
TABLE II: Average query latency (ms). Standard deviation
was less than 0.8% in all cases. The first column indicates the
session length (queries per session – Q/S).
(Table II column 4: SHAImispredict), and when (ii) the user
logs in from the geographic location that is used in the offline
analysis (Table II column 5).
SHAI’s policy enforcement overhead on query latency is
very low (at most 0.34ms). Also, SHAImispredict (when the
user fails to satisfy the runtime checks to acquire capabilities)
achieves better performance than DYNAMIC. The performance
difference is due to tracking the taint and intercepting the
search engine writes in DYNAMIC, whereas the search en-
gine’s accesses within its capability set are not intercepted in
SHAImispredict.
D. Offline analysis
Next, we measure the cost of running the offline analysis
over the expected data flows within the data retrieval system.
The runtime of the analysis depends on the number of tasks,
the number of expected accesses and relevant policies of
each task, and the number of accesses certified (each certified
access may require creating a hard link in the task’s capability
directory). We limit the analysis to a single CPU. The analysis
can be sped up by using more CPUs since its computation
is embarrassingly parallel (except when creating hard links
within the same directory).
a) Indexer and search engine flows: The analysis takes
under 2 seconds to process the flows of the search engine and
the indexer tasks against the entire Wikipedia corpus (∼14.5
million documents subject to ∼80K different policies). Here,
the searchable documents’ policies permit read to the indexer
and the search engine, and the analysis grants both a single
capability for the top level directory of searchable documents.
b) Users flows: Next, we measure the analysis time and
storage requirements for the users of the data retrieval system.
For this experiment, we assume a fixed default geographic
location for every user. For each user, the offline analysis
checks the front-end’s accesses of all public documents, the
user’s private documents, and the friends-only documents of
the user’s friends.
We ran the OA on accesses of 100 users picked at random
from the population. Processing the accesses took 90.5 seconds
per user on average. This can be optimized using a faster
storage medium since most of this time (96.1%) was spent
waiting for the magnetic disk to record hard links for access
capabilities. To quantify potential speed-up when using a
ramdisk, we ran the offline analysis for the same 100 users on
a Dell R640 server machine with 385GB main memory, and
limited the analysis to use only one core of its Xeon Gold 6142
2.60GHz CPUs. This server machine has enough memory to
store the entire Wikipedia corpus in ramdisk, allowing us to
create hard links in ramdisk too. Using the ramdisk to store
hard links, processing each user took under 1.2 seconds on
average (20% of which was spent creating hard links).
Each user’s access capabilities consumed 12.9MB of disk
space to store 145.8K hard links on average. Tasks’ taints and
state conditions consumed less than 11MB of disk space for
all 100 users combined.
E. Indexing
Finally, we measure the overhead of policy enforcement on
the index computation. We run the Lucene indexer over the
entire 258GB snapshot of the English Wikipedia. The resulting
index is 54GB in size. Table 3 shows the average indexing time
in minutes across 3 runs. The standard deviation was less than
2% in all cases.
Average Overhead
BASELINE 652.27
DYNAMIC 672.02 3.02%
SHAI 656.16 0.59%
TABLE III: Indexing time in minutes.
Enforcing policies with SHAI during indexing incurs a
runtime overhead of 0.59%, which is significantly lower than
DYNAMIC’s 3.02%. SHAI’s overhead is due to the fact that the
indexer creates many new files, and all these file creations must
be intercepted to ensure that output has appropriate policy
given the indexer task’s taint. Policy enforcement in DYNAMIC
additionally intercepts the indexer’s writes to the index files
and tracks the indexer’s taint.
Since indexing is a relatively infrequent operation in a
search pipeline, we believe that a runtime overhead of 0.59%
is acceptable. However, in other systems where frequent file
creation occurs on the critical path, runtime interception of
file creation could be avoided as follows. Using an appropriate
Capsicum capability, we can restrict file creation to a specific
directory with an appropriate policy. All files created in this
directory implicitly inherit this policy. The offline analysis can
check upfront that the task creating the files can write to any
file with this policy.
F. Fault-injection tests
To double-check SHAI’s ability to stop data leaks, we ran
the fault injection tests that were originally run on Thoth in [7].
In all tests, SHAI stopped all injected data leaks. (We refer the
reader to [7] for details of the tests.)
VI. RELATED WORK
The work most closely related to SHAI is obviously Thoth.
We have already described how SHAI is a significantly more
efficient re-design of Thoth and how the two differ. In the
following, we describe other closely related work.
Grok [16] is a privacy compliance tool that is deployed
on the backend data analysis pipelines of the Bing search
engine. As opposed to SHAI, which enforces data-specific
policies, Grok enforces only type-specific policies. As a result,
Grok’s analysis can be, and is, entirely static; there is no
runtime component and no runtime overhead. Grok’s analysis
is meant to detect bugs and misconfigurations, not strictly
enforce policies. In fact, the analysis uses possibly unsafe
(but very scalable) heuristics and it can have both false pos-
itives and false negatives, which must be resolved manually.
Nonetheless, Grok demonstrates that policy enforcement can
scale to actual production pipelines.
The idea of runtime coarse-grained taint tracking via kernel
interception was pioneered by the operating systems HiS-
tar [21] and Asbestos [6], and later developed in Flume [12].
However, these operating systems assign abstract taints to
processes; the mapping from taints to policies, as well as the
enforcement of declassification is left to trusted processes. In
contrast, Thoth and SHAI enforce declarative policies (that also
include declassification conditions) directly.
Hybrid policy enforcement: There are a number of other
systems that combine static (offline) analysis with runtime
monitoring for security. Such techniques exist for information
flow control (IFC) [4], [14], [15], enforcing safety prop-
erties [8], [10], and gradual typing [9], [17]. Fredrikson
et. al [10] use abstraction refinement and model checking to
instrument code with sufficient checks to enforce policies, and
Rocha et. al [15] use code analysis to inject policy checks
in program code to enforce IFC and declassification policies.
Moore and Chong use static analysis to reduce monitoring
overhead by selectively marking variables which cannot cause
security violations to not be tracked at runtime [14]. Similar
to SHAI, these approaches try to perform as many checks as
possible statically, and use runtime checks only where static
checks are impossible. However, all these systems combine
static and dynamic analysis at fine-granularity and require
the source code of the application. In contrast, SHAI’s offline
analysis (which can also be viewed as a static analysis) uses
only a description of the system pipeline, not the source or
compiled code of the system. Moreover, SHAI combines static
and dynamic analysis at coarse-granularity. As far as we
know, SHAI is the first system to do this.
RIF is a policy model similar in concept to SHAI/Thoth’s
policy model. RIF has been implemented in an extension of the
Java programming language called JRIF [11]. Like the afore-
mentioned work, JRIF enforces policies at fine-granularity by
hybrid analysis consisting of mostly static inference and some
runtime checks. All the differences from SHAI mentioned
above apply to JRIF as well. JRIF’s declassification conditions
are linked to specific program points, not predicates on the
system/conduit state as in SHAI. It is unclear whether a
pipeline such as Sys-E can be implemented in JRIF and, if
so, what the cost of the runtime checks would be.
Policy debugging: A problem complementary to that
addressed by SHAI is that of debugging policies. This problem
has been addressed in prior work using logic programming
techniques [5], model checking [22] and flow simulations [3].
Although the problem is orthogonal to our goals, some of the
techniques used are similar. For example, PolSim [3] performs
an analysis similar to SHAI’s offline analysis, on the same
policy language. However, unlike SHAI’s goal of checking
that accesses are policy compliant, PolSim seeks to ensure
that the entire pipeline works, despite restrictions imposed by
policies. Consequently, PolSim outputs blocked data flows in
the pipeline and suggestions for how to change the policies to
allow the flows.
VII. CONCLUSION
SHAI shows that it is possible to enforce data-specific
flow policies in data retrieval systems with near-zero runtime
overhead in the common case. SHAI relies on a combination
of an offline flow analysis, session-level binding of runtime
variables, and light-weight runtime monitoring using an OS
capability sandbox to achieve this goal. The key insight behind
SHAI is to push as much work as possible to the offline analy-
sis, often relying on anticipated values of runtime parameters,
and to use efficient OS techniques (light-weight contexts and
Capsicum capabilities) to minimize runtime overhead. This
combination keeps SHAI’s overheads very low, even when the
system throughput is very high.
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